Abstract: Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission's merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not -at least in the eyes of the Commission.
Introduction
For markets where dominance is found, the EC intervenes either by prohibiting the merger outright or, more commonly, requiring a remedy.
Typically the remedies are structural, requiring the divestment of certain assets.
1 The starting objective of this paper is to identify the impact of the remedies imposed for a sample of mergers, in terms of the market structures which would result from the remedies, and to ask whether those structures are likely to be conducive to competition.
This responds to an issue raised by Motta et al. (2003) and Motta (2004) , who point out an important potential trade-off inherent in structural merger remedies. Antitrust authorities need to ensure that a sufficiently viable competitor to the merged entity results from the divestment in order to prevent the merged entity establishing a dominant position. This involves either ensuring a substantial package of assets is divested and/or that the purchaser of the assets is already established in the market. However, this can be at odds with a second objective, avoiding collective dominance (CD) as a result of the remedy. The conventional wisdom is that CD (tacit collusion) is more likely with more symmetric firms (see, for example, Ivaldi et al., 2003) . If so, a remedy that creates a large viable competitor may also increase the likelihood of tacit collusion by creating/increasing symmetry between the buyer and the merged firm. Motta et al. (2003) correctly argue that most of the EC focus appears to have been on the first of these objectives, ensuring a viable competitor, while largely ignoring the possibility that the remedies might create a market structure which is subsequently conducive to CD (see also Compte et al.'s (2002) criticism of the EC decision in the Nestle/Perrier merger in 1992).
The two most comprehensive previous empirical remedy studies (by the US Federal Trade Commission (1999) , as well as the EC's (2005) own evaluation 1 The EC's 2000 Notice on Remedies states a preference for remedies involving the divestiture of a stand-alone business (Monti (2003) ). In addition, from a sample of 229 mergers from [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] in which the EC imposed remedies, Bougette and Turolla (2006) classify 71% of the remedies as at least partly structural. However, see for example Rey (2003) and Papandropoulos and Tajana (2006) for a discussion of the relative merits of behavioural over structural remedies. study) have indeed evaluated the efficacy of structural remedies largely in terms of subsequent viability of the divested assets. 2 In the EC's evaluation, it is argued that requiring a sufficiently large package of divested assets may be essential to the success of the remedy.
The key idea of the present paper, on the other hand, is that structural remedies should be evaluated in terms of their impact on the competitive structure of the markets concerned, and that, as suggested by Motta (2004) , this evaluation should apply the same theories of harm as used to assess the mergers in the first place, namely Single Dominance (SD) and Collective Dominance (CD). Motta (2004) argues that, ideally, a merger should be cleared subject to remedies only if neither SD nor CD is expected to result post-remedy. With this objective, we return to the sample of mergers first used in Davies et al. (2008) to explain EC merger decisions and now assemble a database of the remedies imposed, and estimate, where possible, the market structures resulting from those remedies. In order to assess whether those structures are likely to be conducive to competition, we run them through the estimated structural model of Davies et al. (2008) , previously used to identify the Commission's underlying model of whether the mergers themselves were anticompetitive in the first place. In other words,
we apply the same model of harm to the structures implied by the remedies as was applied when judging the mergers.
Strikingly, a significant proportion (47%) of the resulting market structures are in areas not conducive to competition, in the sense that they would have been remedied had they been the result of a merger. One interpretation of this result is that the Commission has been inconsistent -not applying the same model in designing remedies as that which it uses to assess mergers.
However, a more sympathetic interpretation of this result is possible, and, in our opinion, justified.
2 See Papandropoulos and Tajana (2006) and Lévêque (2007) for more detailed summaries of the findings of the EC study, and Baer and Redcay (2003) for the US study. But see also Duso et al. (2007) , who take an alternative approach by employing an event study methodology. Although the remedy should always be sufficient to redress the antitrust violation, the purpose of a remedy is not to enhance premerger competition but to restore it.
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On balance then, we interpret the stated objective, on both sides of the Atlantic, to one of removing the competition concerns caused by the merger, if unremedied. 6 The upshot is that it is unlikely that remedies can do more than Davies and Lyons (2007) discuss, not only is this the reality for CAs, but also the academic literature suggests that there may be other reasons why intervention beyond restoring the status quo may be undesirable -for restore the market to its pre-merger structure. A problem arises if the premerger structure is not itself competitive in the first place. As we argue, this is precisely the problem faced by the EC in this context -hence our sympathetic interpretation.
The starting point for this paper is an econometric model (Davies et al., 2008) , previously estimated for a sample of mergers, 1990-2004 , where collective dominance (tacit collusion) was considered as a serious issue by the European Commission (EC) in at least one market covered by the merger. In each of these mergers, the EC reveals in its decision document that it has considered the possibilities of both single dominance (SD) and collective dominance (CD) within the same merger -typically for different markets in the same merger. The econometric model achieved a high predictive power in explaining the EC's decisions on whether or not to intervene in each market, and if to intervene, whether for SD or CD. The model therefore reveals the structural conditions under which the Commission believes that different theories of harm can occur. We now use this same model to evaluate the competitiveness of the markets post-remedy.
When tracking the structural remedies imposed in this sample, we find that they typically involve either a prohibition of the entire merger or, more often, a divestiture of the overlap created by the merger in the market of concern (an effective prohibition). The divested assets are then typically purchased by an entrant, and, in effect, the market structure (in terms of the size distribution) is returned to its pre-merger position. We also show that this pre-merger position is itself often (about one third of cases) not conducive to competition.
Moreover, amongst those in which the Commission actually intervened, the proportion is nearly a half. Given then that the typical remedy entails a return to the status quo, and that, very often, that status quo was itself anticompetitive, it is unsurprising that structural remedies will often return the market to an uncompetitive structure.
example, harming incentives for firms to propose efficient mergers (Farrell (2003) ). However, this does not exclude the possibility that, in order to help ensure the viability of the divested asset, the required divestiture package may include assets covering markets where no competition issues have been identified. Typically, for this reason divestiture of an ongoing business is preferred (see Baer and Redcay (2003) and Winckler (2003) We explore these possibilities by returning to our 2008 model, and now revising it by taking into account the rank of the merged entity. We find that for a given post-merger market structure, the Commission is less likely to remedy on the grounds of CD if, post-merger, the merged entity would be the number 2 firm. We explain this reluctance to intervene in such cases in terms of the Commission's willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be tacitly collusive if the alternative is a weakened number 2 firm which is less able to counteract the singly dominant position of the market leader. In that special sense, it is as if the Commission prefers possible collective dominance to single dominance. Collective Dominance. Perhaps unexpectedly, there appears to be a continued reluctance to intervene when the merged entity is not the market leader. The sample period here is only three years, and definitive conclusions are somewhat premature, but the provisional conclusion must be that the revised ECMR has caused a major, and benevolent, re-think on what constitutes an uncompetitive market structure.
Assessing the Competitiveness of Markets
The initial purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of remediesnot only in removing any competitive harm implied by the merger, but also in yielding a post-remedy market structure free of competitive harm. As will become apparent, the two are by no means identical objectives.
In order to do this, we need some means for evaluating the competitiveness of a market, and for this purpose we return to the structural model of dominance in EC merger decisions in Davies et al. (2008) . There, we identified a sample is multinomial logit, using only information on the hypothetical 10 post-merger market shares of the two largest firms (S1 and S2). These are used to construct two explanatory variables: SUM (S1+S2) and RATIO (S2/S1)). It is 7 This argument relies on an assumption referred to as X-homogeneity: all markets covered by a given merger share the same X market characteristics. If this assumption holds, then the decision to intervene in some markets in a particular merger but not in others can be explained by structural conditions rather than X market characteristics. See Davies et al. (2008) for more detailed discussion and empirical evidence supporting this assumption. 8 There are 14 markets in the sample where the EC finds CD between a group of firms that are 'structurally linked' in some way (usually shareholdings). In these cases the EC essentially views these firms as a single entity. Here, following Davies et al. (2008) , we combine the shares of the linked firms and treat them as SD decisions. 9 By construction, the sample includes all mergers where collective dominance might have been an issue in at least one market covered by the merger. In the event, in many of these mergers, it intervened in some other markets on the grounds of single dominance. 10 Throughout the paper, all post-merger market shares are hypothetical in two senses: the post-merger share is assumed to be the sum of the merging parties' pre-merger shares, and assuming, for this purpose, that the merger is not blocked/remedied.
worth noting that S1 is typically, but not always, the post-merger market share of the merged entity, a point to which we return in section 5.
These two variables are both strongly significant at the 99% level in both the equations for SD and CD. They also have the expected signs, indicating that interventions are more likely in concentrated markets (high SUM) and, for CD, in symmetric markets (high RATIO) but for SD in asymmetric markets (low RATIO). The model successfully explains 79% of all decisions. Figure 1 displays the predicted decisions graphically, and Table 1 shows the different possible outcomes implied, depending upon the size of the number 1 and 2 ranked firms. 11 The predicted decision is the one to which the estimated model attaches the highest probability.
SD NI CD
Thus, when the #1 ranked firm has a very large post-merger market share (>65%), the model predicts that the Commission will always decide SD.
However, at lower values for S1, the decision also depends crucially on the size of S2 post-merger. For example, at S1=55%, while the Commission will always judge the structure to entail dominance, this will be single dominance if S2 is relatively small, but collective dominance if S2 is relatively large.
Perhaps most interesting is where S1=45% -again S2 is crucial, but here all three outcomes can occur, depending on S2: where S2 is 'large', the EC opts for a CD decision; where S2 is 'small', it opts for SD; but for intermediate S2 Since this model achieves a high predictive power in uncovering the Commission's implicit structural model, we will also use it here to classify the competitiveness of any market structure. Hereafter, we refer to any market structure as 'dominant' if (S1, S2) implies location of the market in the SD or CD regions in Figure 1 . Otherwise, structures are referred to as 'competitive' -when (S1, S2) lies in the NI range.
Competitiveness of Pre-and Post-Merger Market Structures
As discussed above, the pre-merger structure is likely to be an important restriction on the powers of a CA to intervene. Therefore, we begin by assessing the competitiveness of the pre-merger market structures: this is only possible for 174 of the 222 markets.
12 Table 2 reports the results of applying this structural model to assess the 'competitiveness' of each of these markets, using estimates of what S1 and S2 were both before the merger (PRE) and post-merger (MERGER). While PRE always refers to 'actual' shares, MERGER refers to hypotheticals -what would have happened, absent any remedy imposed, and assuming that the merged firm's share was the sum of the parties' pre-merger shares. This establishes a point which is key to the rest of the paper: the EC will often be constrained in securing competitive outcomes post-remedy by a starting point which is already 'anticompetitive'. We pursue this first, in section 4, for the subset of cases where the EC actually intervened, by exploring the remedies imposed. In section 5, we then return to the full sample by reintroducing those markets where there was no intervention.
The Intervened Markets and the Impact of Structural Remedies
Within the 174 markets for which we have both PRE and MERGER data, the EC actually intervened (by remedy or prohibition) in 92, and in 40 of these, pre-merger structures were already anticompetitive: 
The Remedy Sample
We now follow this sample of interventions by examining the remedies imposed: identifying the nature of remedies, and, where structural, the scale of divested assets and the identity of the purchasers.
In the event, we have been able to extract useable data on remedies for only 17 of the above 25 mergers, accounting for 66 markets, 13 with interventions designed to counteract CD in 23 cases and SD for 43 cases. All remedies examined are structural. 
Scale of Divested Assets
Six of the mergers (accounting for 30 relevant markets), were prohibited, in all markets, by the EC, or the merged parties abandoned the merger; and, in these cases, of course, markets were essentially returned to their pre-merger structures. In the other 36 markets, various assets were divested: in 23 cases, the market share of the divested assets was equal to the market share of one of the merging parties (typically the smaller party); in 9, the divested assets were smaller than the size of the smaller party, and in only 4 cases the divested assets were larger than the size of the smaller party. This leads to: 
Identity of the Purchaser
In only one of the mergers was the purchaser of the divested assets already present in the market concerned. 16 In all others, it was an entrant, 17 and in 13 Requirements that the merging parties should identify an up-front buyer of the divested assets are becoming increasingly common, in the EC and especially in the US (see Baer and Redcay (2003) and Wincker (2003)). However, over the time period covered here, it has not always been possible to identify the purchaser or the precise pre-merger market structure. 14 Often some behavioural conditions were imposed in addition to the required divestiture. In a few cases purely behavioural remedies were accepted, but these are not analysed here. 15 In addition, even when the purchaser of the divested assets was already present in the market of concern this firm's gain in market share was not sufficient to take this firm into the top 2 ranked firms. Therefore, in all 53 cases S1 and S2 return to their pre-merger levels. 16 However, this one covered 17 different markets (M.3314 Air Liquide/Messer Targets).
these cases it follows that the market structure (in terms of the firm size distribution) post-remedy will be very similar to the pre-merger structure.
Indeed, in the special case, where the divested assets are identical in size to those of one of the parties, the two market structures will be identical. Since the same is also true, of course, for outright prohibition of the merger, it follows that:
FINDING 2(b): the most common outcome (in 67%=44/66 of cases) of a structural remedy is to return the market to the exact pre-merger structure. Davies and Lyons (2007) refer to this outcome as "prohibition within the market" since, even if the merger is not prohibited in all markets, such a remedy in a particular market implies a return to the status quo structure in that market. 18 For present purposes, this confirms that the status quo premerger market structure will typically play a central role. Table 3 reports the results from applying the structural model to the market structures resulting from the remedies imposed in these 66 markets. The first row yields:
Efficacy of the Remedies
17 'Entrant' here denotes a new player in the specific market (member state and product) concerned. Very often, these firms are already present in the same market but in different countries and/or in adjacent product markets. Arguably the EC views such purchasers as less risky (Oldale (2002) ). However, this may also increase multi-market contact and increase the likelihood of tacit collusion (see Motta et al. (2003) ). 18 This is consistent with the merging parties offering to prohibit the merger in markets where the EC identifies a problem in order to get it cleared quickly in all other markets; see Farrell (2003) and Lyons and Medvedev (2007) on the bargaining process over remedies between the merging parties and the CA.
FINDING 3: In nearly half (47%=31/66) of cases, divestment remedies have resulted in structures which the Commission would have sought to remedy had they been the result of a merger, rather than a remedy.
One interpretation of this finding is simply that the Commission has been inconsistent in the criteria it applies (i) when assessing a merger in the first place, and (ii) when agreeing remedies with the parties. However, Finding 2(b) suggests a more 'sympathetic' interpretation. This is that the Commission is largely constrained by not being able to impose a remedy which does more than return the market to its pre-merger status quo. If that status quo was itself characterised by dominance, then so too will be any structure attainable by a viable remedy as Table 3 shows this occurs in 25 of the 31 cases which resulted in dominance post-remedy.
Choosing Between Anticompetitive Structures/Theories of Harm
Even if we are to accept this 'sympathetic' interpretation, there remains the question: "in choosing an 'unsuccessful' remedy (which returns the market to an uncompetitive pre-merger status quo), why does the Commission prefer this over the structure (also uncompetitive) which would have resulted had it left the merger unremedied? But equally, we should also pose the parallel question: are there yet other cases where the Commission prefers not to remedy because it judges an uncompetitive post-merger structure to be preferable over an uncompetitive pre-merger status quo?
The second question is easily answered: returning now to the 82 markets in which the Commission did not intervene, there were indeed 13 in which both the PRE-and POST-MERGER market structures implied dominance, according to our structural model.
If we now combine these non-intervention cases with the 92 intervention cases analysed in the previous section, there is a total of 53 markets (58%) in which both PRE-and POST-MERGER structures implied dominance (Table 4) . Thus, in all these markets, the Commission was effectively faced with an implicit choice between anti-competitive market structures. Table 5 ).
The remainder of this section attempts to identify on what basis these choices were made. In particular, we are interested in the possibility that the Commission reveals an implicit preference for one theory of harm over another.
First, it is important to recall that this particular sample was deliberately confined to the years preceding the revision of the ECMR in 2004. Up to that revision (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , the Commission was constrained in how it could deal with non-coordinated effects -its only tool was to intervene on the grounds of Single Dominance (SD). However, SD necessarily required that the number 1 ranked firm (#1) was involved. It follows therefore that, although the Commission might be able to equate a given market structure with SD if #1 was involved, it could not if the merged firm was #2. In these circumstances It is likely, therefore that, insofar as the choice between anticompetitive structures might also entail a choice between SD and CD, the rank of the merged firm might be important. On the one hand, a judgement of SD could only be brought for #1 firms, but on the other hand, there might have been a tendency to make CD judgements more frequently for #2 firms -if CD was used as a surrogate for non-coordinated effects where a #2 firm is involved. In fact, it is clear (Table 5 ) that the rank of the merged firm in these cases is an extremely good predictor of whether the EC will intervene: the probability of intervention is 95% where #1 is involved, but only 15% for #2. On this basis, there is little evidence of the surrogate CD hypothesis. But to examine this role of firm ranking more rigorously, we now return to the structural model of our earlier paper (2008) . It should be noted that the model used the hypothetical market shares of the two largest firms post-merger, making no distinction by their identity, i.e. the merged entity may be #1 or #2.
Here, however, we re-estimate the model separately for two sub-samples, distinguishing whether the merged firm was #1 or #2 (Table 6 ). Where the merged entity is #1 post-merger, as before, the EC has a choice between NI, SD and CD and so multinomial logit estimation remains appropriate; however, as just explained, when the merged entity is #2 post-merger, the choice set is restricted to NI and CD, and therefore binary probit estimation is used. Finding 4 thus confirms that there is no support for the hypothesis that, under the old ECMR, the Commission might sometimes have used CD as justification for intervention where a lessening of competition was likely to occur without coordinated behaviour, but where the merger could not be prevented on SD grounds.
collusion. As we argue in the text, this range will be underestimated by the area under the diagonal because, when the merged firm is #2, the EC tries to balance the possibility of tacit collusion against the risk of otherwise strengthening a position of single dominance for the market leader. Indeed, Finding 4 raises the contrary question of why is the EC less likely to intervene against CD when the merger does not involve the market leader?
We believe that the answer lies in the sort of impact any structural remedy might have in these circumstances. Clearly it is unable to reduce the size of the leader, but it can reduce market share symmetry, and thus help to reduce concerns of collective dominance. However, in that case, the remedy imposed on a #2 firm leaves the market leader unchanged, and moves the market closer to a position of SD, in that the leader is less constrained by a sizeable #2 firm, than would be true if the remedy were not imposed (see Table 1 ).
In order to explore this possibility, we now focus in more detail on those sample markets located in the CDboth and CD1only in Figure 2b . First, in
CDboth markets, the EC does typically intervene for collective dominance (3/4 and 4/5 where the merged entity is number 1 and 2 respectively), but in CD1only, collective dominance decisions are rare (3/9) when the merged entity is #2 20 and much more common (13/17) when #1. This is as suggested by the econometric results.
In addition, and as a test of the above hypothesis, we then use the SD equation reported in Table 6 to predict the probability of SD, using PREmerger market shares (for those markets with pre-merger data available). This therefore allows us to assess the impact of any intervention requiring a return to the status quo, i.e. as in a typical structural remedy. As can be seen, in those markets in this area where the merger involves #2, any remedy involving a return to the status quo will, on average, return the market to a position of single dominance with a probability of nearly 50%, as compared to only 10% if the merged firm is #1:
FINDING 5: for those market structures in which the EC (typically) intervenes on the grounds of collective dominance if the merged firm is #1 but not #2, the predicted probability of single dominance PRE-merger is significantly lower.
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The result is certainly consistent with our hypothesis that non-intervention is based on the possible countervailing effects of the merger on the market leader's singly dominant position. This is in spite of the possibility that the larger share of #2 may be more conducive to tacit collusion. 22 In this sense, where it reports that the market share of the divested businesses had decreased in 44% of cases 3-5 years later (as opposed to increasing in only 18% of cases). In contrast, for the business retained by the merged entity, the market share increased in 47% of cases (decreasing in only 33%) over the same period of time. This implies that any remedy that returns a market to a pre-merger position close to SD may over time move even closer to an SD position as the market share of the divested asset declines, further justifying a decision not to intervene. A t-test shows that the mean probability of SD pre-merger when the merged entity is #2 is significantly higher than when it is #1 (p<0.01). 22 Ideally, further evidence to support this explanation could be obtained by examining only those markets in this area where the merged entity is the number 2 ranked firm and comparing the probability of SD in the cases where no intervention occurred with the few where the EC did intervene. The latter should, according to our explanation, be those with a lower probability of SD pre-merger. This clearly has not been possible here due to the restricted sample size. 23 As Papandropoulos and Tajana (2006) point out, the decline in the market share of the divested business is also consistent with intense competition from the merged entity. However, Farrell (2003) demonstrates that for the merged
Post-2004 Change in the Merger Regulation
Thus far, this paper has been concerned with merger decisions and remedies only up until the revision of the ECMR in mid-2004. As explained earlier, it has been argued (for example, Motta (2004) and Vickers (2004) ), that, over this period, a certain class of mergers might have been left un-remedied, in spite of potential consumer harm, because they did not create a dominant firm or increase the possibility of coordinated behaviour. It is argued that, under the old ECMR, it was difficult for the EC to intervene in such cases -often referred to as 'gap' cases. But it has also been alternatively suggested that the Commission may have attempted to intervene in such cases by inappropriately applying a collective dominance theory of harm. Motta (2004) cites the EC prohibition of the Airtours/First Choice merger 24 in the late 1990s
(subsequently overturned by the appeals court) as a possible example. To explore what impact the revised regulation has actually had on decisions, this section extends the sample of mergers examined until mid-2007. This identifies a further 19 mergers (covering 334 markets) which meet the criteria used for the previous sample: decision documents reveal that CD/coordinated effects (CE) 27 were seriously considered in the case. As before, in order to entity and the buyer of the divested assets there may be joint incentives to reduce the value of the divested assets, especially when the buyer is already incumbent in the market. 24 M.1524 Airtours/First Choice. 25 There is in fact some debate over the extent to which the revisions to the ECMR represented a substantive change rather than simply a clarification of the scope for intervention in merger control; see Röller and Mano (2006) who suggest that the new ECMR continues a pre-2004 trend towards a more effects-based merger policy. 26 The new ECMR also now explicitly recognises the possible of an efficiency defence. 27 Under the new ECMR typically CD cases became referred to as coordinated effects and cases brought on noncoordinated grounds as unilateral effects with still also the possibility of finding SD.
control for the unobservable X market characteristics (section 2), we focus only on those mergers in which the EC actually intervened in one or more markets.
In fact, interventions for CE 28 have been extremely rare: in only three markets. 29 It is unclear to what extent this can be directly attributed to the revision itself, especially as two important appeals court decisions may have lessened the Commission's appetite for making CD/CE decisions. 30 In any event, the small number is certainly consistent with the argument that the burden of proof is higher for CE than UE (Kühn (2001) and Baxter and Dethmers (2006) ). Surprisingly, even in the few cases where CE was found to be a problem, in two it was coupled with a finding of UE in the same market (treated as UE/CE decisions in the analysis below).
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To examine these new cases in the light of the earlier findings, Table 8 cross- tabulates the Commission's decisions against the predicted decisions under the old ECMR -computed by inserting the hypothetical post-merger S1 and S2 into the equations of our re-estimated structural model in Table 6 Röller and Mano (2006) , we do not attempt to classify decisions which the document refers to as SD/UE between SD and UE. This distinction is often unclear in the decision documents, and as explained by Baxter and Dethmers (2005) is often in reality merely a question of semantics. For our purpose here, it is unnecessary to make the distinction. Since we have currently have no information on the remedies imposed in these cases, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about how far these results can be explained in terms of the trade-offs between post-merger and pre-merger structures. In the absence of this, the most striking conclusion is the increased reluctance to make any sort of intervention.
Finally, the three cases where CE was found merit some discussion, even though it would be wrong to draw any definitive conclusions on such a small number. Rather surprisingly, in two of these, the decision was that the merger would lead to either CE or UE. Superficially, this suggests that the availability of an extra possible theory of harm might make the Commission rather more inclined to intervene. However, the aggregate figures just discussed suggest that this is not so. Furthermore, the use of both theories of harm simultaneously seems strange: firstly, that there is typically a trade-off between the two (see for example Kühn (2001) and secondly, under the more effects-based approach allowed under the new ECMR, selecting the appropriate theory of harm for the market concerned should surely be of critical importance. Whether the merger has a counteracting effect as opposed to making tacit collusion more likely will depend upon the nature of competition expected to prevail post-merger. This in turn will depend in part upon the characteristics of the market e.g. the degree of transparency.
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These two particular cases are also significant in that, in both, the role of a maverick firm is stressed.
Here the EC appears to use the term 'maverick' to refer to firms with substantial available capacity and which operate aggressive pricing strategies. 35 It is argued that as a result of the merger between the maverick and a rival this maverick role will be reduced/cease. Evidence from the sample of cases before the change in the ECMR suggests that the role of maverick firms in CD cases was extremely rare. It is also apparent that post-2004 the role of maverick firms appears to not be restricted to just CE analysis but surprisingly has also been applied when considering potential UE. 
Implications and Applicability
We have drawn three main conclusions within this paper. First, merger remedies (including prohibitions) will not necessarily return a market to a competitive structure. In practice, the state of competition in the market premerger will often constrain how much can be achieved by a competition authority if and when it remedies a merger. A corollary is that there may sometimes be an argument for not intervening in a seemingly anticompetitive merger if the pre-merger market structure was also anticompetitive. Both these possibilities appear to occur quite frequently in the sample investigated here. In order to make this point, we have, necessarily, employed a particular sample of mergers and a particular empirical model defining what constitutes an anticompetitive structure. Both the sample and model might be contested, but the general proposition remains valid. Mergers should always be assessed, not only in terms of their likely impact on competition, but also in terms of the potential limits on what might be attainable by intervention. 34 In fact Röller and Mano (2006) suggest that there is evidence that, post-2004, market characteristics has played an increased role in EC merger decisions. 35 In the T.Mobile/Tele.ring mobile phone merger this was in part made possible by Tele.ring's low installed customer base. 36 In the discussion of the T.Mobile/Tele.ring merger in CRA International (2006) it is suggested that the use of a maverick firm argument was out of place in the UE analysis.
Second, when deciding whether or not to intervene, a competition authority will sometimes have to choose the lesser of two evils, and sometimes this may involve weighing up the likely harm involved from unilateral versus coordinated effects (and the respective probabilities that they will occur). In this particular paper, we have used the ECMR, as it was up to 2004, as our case study, but again the proposition should be quite general. As it happens, in this case, we argue that the EC's decisions suggest that they seem to have preferred the possibility of collective to single dominance, especially when the merger involves a firm which would be ranked #2. We suggest that this is because, while a strengthened number 2 firm may increase the chances of tacit collusion, it might alternatively act as a counteracting force, constraining the power of an otherwise dominant market leader.
Third, we have argued that the revision of the ECMR might have been expected to affect the choices made by the Commission, not least because it was now able to intervene on the grounds of unilateral effects even when the merged firm would be #2. In the event, the apparently overriding effect, at least in the first three years after revision, has been to reduce the incidence of all types of intervention, but especially for coordinated effects.
